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The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may
blow through it-the storm may enter-the rain may enter-but
the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement!
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham1
I. INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century has witnessed a steady increase in govern-
mental regulatory activity, especially in the commercial context.2 As
a result of the eagerness of federal and state governments to promote
the safety of workers,3 businesses are constantly under the watchful
1. Speech by William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, at the House of Lords (n.d.), reprinted in
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 379 (2d ed. 1953).
2. The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127,
1129 n. 14 (1984) [hereinafter Methodologies].
3. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.2, at 629 (2d ed. 1987).
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eye of governmental agencies.4 In carrying out their duties, agencies
quite often presume the ability to enter and inspect a business' prem-
ises and operations.5 Such entry is designed to permit inspectors to
examine the structure in which a business is housed, inspect business
products, or peruse financial books and records.6 Indeed, this form of
administrative agency inspection is "commonplace in our society." 7
During such inspections, governmental investigative power frequently
clashes with employers' fourth amendment 8 rights against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.
When confronted with the issue of the constitutionality of war-
rantless administrative searches in the commercial context, the
United States Supreme Court initially held that the fourth amend-
ment was inapplicable.9 The Court overruled this line of reasoning in
See v. City of Seattle, 10 where it held that the fourth amendment's
protection against warrantless searches extended to administrative
searches of business premises. 1 In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,2 more-
over, the Supreme Court specifically held the fourth amendment
applicable to inspections conducted pursuant to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA)," through which the federal govern-
ment monitors safety and health concerns. 14 Although the Court
articulated fairly strong employers' fourth amendment rights with
4. Id.
5. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1967); see also Schwartz, CrucialAreas in
Administrative Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 425-30 (1966).
6. See, 387 U.S. at 544.
7. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 10.2, at 629.
8. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. In the companion cases of Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, reh'g denied, 329 U.S.
824 (1946), and Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947), the
Supreme Court upheld warrantless inspections conducted on commercial premises. One
commentator has argued that the Supreme Court based each decision on a consent theory. 3
W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 10.2, at 630-31. According to his analysis, the Supreme Court did
not answer the question of when a warrantless inspection was constitutionally permissible. Id.;
see See, 387 U.S. at 545 n.7. For a case that upheld a warrantless administrative inspection of
a home, see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959), overruled,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
10. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
11. Id. at 545.
12. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
14. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 59, 60 (S. Bokat & H. Thompson III
eds. 1988).
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respect to administrative searches in both See and Barlow's, subse-
quent decisions have narrowed the scope of protection for
employers. t 5
Governmental agencies adopt several arguments in support of
their power to conduct warrantless inspections. They claim that
requiring a warrant is too burdensome,' 6 both for the particular
agency that has to procure the warrant, and for the judicial system
whose overworked courts must rule on "routine applications and
motions to enforce or quash the warrants."' 7 Agencies also argue
that warrantless searches are necessary for the efficient and effective
enforcement of regulatory schemes,' 8 and for deterring violations of
applicable statutes and regulations.' 9 The history of the fourth
amendment, the purposes served by the fourth amendment warrant
requirement, and the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
administrative agency inspections in See and Barlow's, however, all
militate against these expediency-based arguments. While the Court
has recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment in the context of administrative inspections in the commercial
setting,20 the operation of the warrant requirement should not turn on
the convenience of governmental agencies or the courts. The purpose
of the warrant requirement is to prevent arbitrary governmental inva-
sions through judicial intervention prior to the conduct of a search. 21
Although this requirement necessitates a time consuming process,
questions of burdensomeness, efficiency, and deterrence should play
no part in determining the applicability of the fourth amendment. 2
2
Even when a search warrant is not required for administrative
inspections, the judiciary can implement fourth amendment safe-
15. See Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to
Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341, 341 (1975).
16. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1988).
17. Id.
18. See Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
(1972) (The Supreme Court concluded that warrantless inspections were necessary for proper
enforcement and effective inspection.). But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533
(1967) (The Supreme Court rejected an effective enforcement argument.).
19. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
20. The pervasively regulated industries exception is one such exception. The Supreme
Court first discussed this exception in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970). For an analysis of this exception, see infra notes 120-56 and accompanying text.
21. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978); Camara, 387 U.S. at 527.
22. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997. But see U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909-10 (1984). In
modifying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in Leon, the Supreme Court accounted for
the rule's deterrent effect. Id. However, the Court recognized that the applicability of the
exclusionary rule "is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated."' Id. at 906 (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 464 U.S. 213, 223, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983)).
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guards both through the administrative probable cause standard and
the administrative subpoena.23  These alternative solutions are less
protective of employers' pivacy interests than search warrants in the
criminal law context.24 Their utility, however, lies in their recogni-
tion of the competing stakes-protecting employers from arbitrary
governmental intrusions through judicial intervention and promoting
public safety by maintaining effective enforcement of agency
regulations.25
Three recent federal courts of appeals cases26 illustrate the ten-
sions between governmental agency investigative power and employ-
ers' fourth amendment rights. In each of these cases, United States
Labor Department compliance officers27 attempted to conduct war-
23. For an analysis of the administrative probable cause standard, see infra notes 64-68
and accompanying text; for an analogous discussion of the administrative subpoena, see infra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
24. In order to obtain a search warrant in the criminal context, a governmental agency
must satisfy a more rigorous probable cause standard than the administrative probable cause
standard. In a criminal investigation, a search "undertaken to recover specific stolen or
contraband goods... even with a warrant, is 'reasonable' only when there is 'probable cause'
to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling." Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see
Note, Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Probable Cause
Requirements for Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 GEo. L.J. 1183 (1982)
(distinguishing between routine and nonroutine administrative searches and arguing for the
implementation of the traditional criminal probable cause standard in the context of
nonroutine searches).
The distinction between the administrative and criminal probable cause standards raises a
definitional question: how is an administrative search distinct from a criminal search? In New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Supreme Court distinguished between "traditional
police searches conducted for the gathering of criminal evidence ... [and] administrative
inspections designed to enforce regulatory statutes." Id. at 700 (citation omitted). One
commentator defines administrative, or civil, searches "to include all ... cases outside the
traditional core of criminal law enforcement." Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1131 n.22.
Included in this definition are "cases containing elements of both a civil and criminal nature,
such as routine traffic regulation or border searches." Id. (citations omitted). In particular,
border patrols "enforce criminal laws against importing illegal aliens, but their efforts also
result in prevented entries without criminal penalties." Id. (citations omitted). For purposes
of distinguishing between administrative and criminal searches, this Comment adopts the
commentator's perspective.
25. Cf McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724, 727 (4th Cir. 1988).
26. The three cases are: (1) McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988); (2)
McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988); and (3) Brock v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).
27. A compliance officer is an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) representative
of the Labor Department. During inspections of business premises, a compliance officer's role
"is to represent OSHA to the public and to carry out the policies and procedures of the agency
.... [T]he compliance officer is an agent ... of OSHA, and is, therefore, charged with the
ensuring of a safe and healthful workplace." OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW,
supra note 14, at 207.
OSHA administrators distinguish between different types of compliance officers based on
the matters which they investigate. There "are two categories of inspectors: safety inspectors
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rantless inspections of employers' safety and health records pursuant
to OSHA regulations. These regulations28 required employers to keep
the records on their business premises and to make them available to
compliance officers.29 Because the employers in these cases did not
abide by the compliaihce officers' requests, each one was cited for vio-
lating the OSHA regulations.30 Thus, each case presented the identi-
cal issue of whether the applicable OSHA regulations were
constitutional under the fourth amendment insofar as they permitted
warrantless searches of an employer's occupational safety and health
records.3 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits invalidated the regulations, to the extent that they
permitted the warrantless searches.32 In particular, the Sixth Circuit
found the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Burger33 control-
ling,34 and concluded that the applicable regulations were unconstitu-
tional because they did not require the compliance officers to procure
a search warrant or an administrative subpoena.35 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the employer's fourth amendment position,
totally ignoring the Burger decision.36
Section II of this Comment offers a summary of the history of the
fourth amendment as it pertains to administrative inspections of
homes and businesses. In addition to tracing the historical develop-
ment of the fourth amendment, it focuses on the purposes served by
the warrant requirement, and summarizes the judicial treatment of
the applicability of the warrant requirement to administrative inspec-
tions. Section III scrutinizes the three recent federal courts of appeals
cases, presenting the factual foundation of each case, and examining
the analytic framework utilized by the courts. Section IV critiques
the Fourth Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of the
OSHA regulations on the basis of several factors: the applicability of
and industrial hygiene inspectors." D. LOFGREN, DANGEROUS PREMISES: AN INSIDER'S
VIEW OF OSHA ENFORCEMENT 5 (1989). Safety inspectors investigate hazards "that can
cause death or injury by burial or fall as a result of physical contact with machinery or
electricity." Id. at 4. Industrial hygiene inspectors investigate hazards "that may cause harm
through exposure to chemicals, noise, or microwave radiation." Id.
28. See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a) (1989).
30. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 992; A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 725; Emerson, 834 F.2d at
996.
31. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 993; A.R Chance, 842 F.2d at 726; Emerson, 834 F.2d at
996-97.
32. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997; Emerson, 834 F.2d at 997.
33. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
34. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 995 n.3.
35. Id. at 996-97.
36. McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724, 728-29 (4th Cir. 1988).
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the See-Barlow's rationale, the adequacy of the balancing test
employed by the court, and policy concerns in today's regulatory soci-
ety. Moreover, Section IV suggests that the Sixth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of Burger provides a better mode of analysis than that employed
by the Fourth Circuit. Section V concludes that courts should imple-
ment the Burger analytic framework in order to provide more effec-
tive judicial vigilance over administrative searches.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES: A FOURTH AMENDMENT
PERSPECTIVE
The seminal principle of the fourth amendment is that, except in
certain limited classes of cases, governmental officials must obtain a
warrant prior to conducting a search in order for the search to be
deemed reasonable and, therefore, constitutional.37 The Supreme
Court has extended this principle to administrative searches in the
commercial setting.38 Since the apparent expression of this determi-
nation,39 courts have upheld warrantless administrative searches by
balancing governmental and individual interests.' In McLaughlin v.
A.B. Chance,4" the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
OSHA regulations permitting compliance officers to cite employers
who refused to voluntarily produce safety and health records upon
request. In order to thoroughly evaluate the discord among the
courts, it is important to examine the history of the fourth amend-
ment, the policies served by the search warrant, and the emergence of
case law extending the fourth amendment warrant requirement to
administrative searches in the commercial sphere.
A. Overview of the Fourth Amendment: The Administrative
Context
The fourth amendment is rooted in both English history and the
American colonial experience. In England, the judiciary recognized
the limitations of the Crown's investigatory powers in the late eight-
eenth century.42 Although the English courts may have been
attempting to protect the property interests of the landed classes,
rather than basing their decisions on any notion of individual pri-
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
38. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
41. 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4.
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vacy, 43 these cases stand for the principle that a government has lim-
ited power to arbitrarily enter and search an individual's property. 44
In the United States, the fourth amendment stems largely from the
colonists' outrage against the writs of assistance 4 5 "utilized by cus-
toms officers to enter and search buildings for smuggled goods. 46
The ratified version of the Constitution, however, contained no decla-
ration of individual rights.47 Not until George Washington became
president did an amendment process to add a declaration of citizens'
rights begin.48 This process culminated in the adoption of the first ten
amendments to the Constitution.
The fourth amendment did not become a prominently litigated
amendment until the federal government's criminal jurisdiction
heightened-approximately one hundred years after the adoption of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.49 Since this time, the
Supreme Court has faced a difficult task in delineating the rights of
individuals under the amendment.5 " Nevertheless, the Court has
acknowledged that "one governing principle, justified by history and
current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a
search warrant."5"
Courts have developed a two-tiered analysis to resolve fourth
amendment questions. 2 The first inquiry is "whether the govern-
ment's conduct constitutes a search or seizure by infringing upon a
43. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 428-30 (Schwartz provides a property-type analysis of
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).).
44. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959), overruled
on other grounds, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
45. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Frank, 359 U.S. at 364
(describing the fervor with which American colonists protested the use of writs of assistance).
46. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4.
47. For an analysis of the reasons why the framers of the Constitution did not include such
a declaration and the process by which the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, see N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 83-105 (1937).
48. Id. at 97.
49. Id. at 106.
50. See generally Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980) (criticizing the Warren
and Burger Courts for failing to maintain fourth amendment doctrinal consistency).
51. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (citing Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)).
52. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416, 430 (D.D.C.),
modified on other grounds, 3 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 128 (D.D.C.), stay granted,
3 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 128 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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reasonable expectation of privacy."" The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "[a]n owner or operator of a business.., has an expecta-
tion of privacy in commercial property, which society is prepared to
consider to be reasonable."'5 4 Courts have employed a case-by-case
approach to determine whether in a particular instance a business
owner's privacy expectation is reasonable."5
The second inquiry is "if a search or seizure occurred,... was
[it] reasonable. '" '56 A governmental agency generally satisfies the rea-
sonableness requirement by procuring a warrant based upon probable
cause. " In certain limited circumstances, however, the Supreme
Court has not required either a warrant or probable cause.58 In such
instances, the Court analyzes the government's action by balancing
the interests of individuals and government.59 The Court usually
adjudges a warrantless search reasonable if governmental regulatory
interests outweigh individual privacy interests. This latter approach
is increasingly reflected in the context of administrative searches."
The justifications for this approach are two-fold. First, according to
the Court, privacy interests in commercial premises are "different
from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's
home,"' 6' and administrative inspections intrude minimally into such
interests.62 Second, the public interest demands a balancing
methodology.63
In the administrative searches context, the Supreme ,Court has
adopted two doctrines that facilitate agency inspections, but provide
some judicial scrutiny of agency discretion. In Camara v. Municipal
Court,"M the Court adopted the administrative probable cause stan-
dard.65 A governmental agency meets this standard when "reason-
able legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
53. Id.; see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984); see also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
55. United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (Courts focus on
whether the business owner has made a sufficient showing of a possessory or proprietary
interest in the area searched and whether he has demonstrated a sufficient nexus between his
work space and the area searched.).
56. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 430.
57. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 337.
60. United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 193 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
61. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
62. See Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1135-38.
63. Id. at 1138-39.
64. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
65. Id. at 538-39.
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inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]. 66
In contrast to the criminal probable cause standard,67 such legislative
or administrative standards do not "necessarily depend upon specific
knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling." 68 Moreover,
in See v. City of Seattle,69 the Court delineated the requirements that
an agency must meet when it issues a subpoena in order for it to be
deemed constitutional.7 ° "[Wihen an administrative agency subpoe-
nas corporate book or records,.., the subpoena [must] be sufficiently
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome."'"
B. Purpoes of the Warrant Requirement
An understanding of the purposes served by the warrant require-
ment is essential to the proper determination of whether courts should
require a warrant, or at a minimum an administrative subpoena, in
the context of administrative searches of commercial premises. In a
criminal investigation, 72 a search warrant serves several purposes.
First, it limits the discretionary power of a police officer in determin-
66. Id. at 538; see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978) (stating that a
governmental agency may satisfy the administrative probable cause standard either on the
basis of specific evidence of an existing violation or the Camara standard).
67. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
68. Id. at 538. Two recent OSHA cases discussed the administrative probable cause
standard. -See Industrial Steel Prods. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 854 F.2d
1330 (5th Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Trinity Indus., 824 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1987).
69. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
70. Id. at 544-45.
71. Id. at 544.
72. The procedures followed by police officers in attempting to secure and execute search
warrants serves as a useful model in identifying the purposes served by a warrant. Although
the following model is simplified, it is useful in identifying the policies that the warrant
requirement serves.
In order to obtain a warrant, a police officer must "fill out an application which
particularly describes what the authorities expect to find and where they expect to find it." C.
DUCAT & H. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1012 (4th ed. 1988). Upon
completion, a magistrate evaluates the application to determine whether probable cause exists.
Id. The magistrate must determine whether "there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238,
reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
In the execution of the search warrant, "officers are limited to the specific areas indicated
and are not entitled to enlarge the scope of the search into a general hunt for evidence." C.
DUCAT & H. CHASE, supra, at 1012. However, officers are allowed to seize evidence that is in
plain view. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (citing Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924)). "Warrant procedures also provide that, after a search has been conducted and
materials seized, a copy of the warrant . . . [must] be returned to the magistrate with an
account of the evidence obtained." C. DUCAT & H. CHASE, supra, at 1012.
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ing whether a search is appropriate.73 The magistrate's judgment
takes the place of the policeman's judgment.74 Second, the warrant
requirement prevents illegal searches prior to their occurrence.
Because individual citizens have a personal right to privacy in their
homes, injury to that right should be prevented, to the extent possible,
before its occurrence:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is... a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses
to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.
When the right of privacy must yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or gov-
ernment enforcement agent.75
Third, the warrant requirement prevents hindsight from coloring
the probable cause determination.76 If the decisions of police officers
were subject only to post-search judicial scrutiny, the judiciary's prob-
able cause determinations would undoubtedly be tainted in cases
when evidence of crime was found. In such situations, judges would
be hard pressed not to find post-hoc probable cause, regardless of
what the pre-search determination might have been.
Finally, the warrant requirement legitimizes the legal system
because it limits police conduct, even when the police "act[s] for a
majority with a great collective need."' 77 The warrant requirement
allows police conduct to be independently scrutinized. This interven-
tion increases public confidence in law enforcement. Without judicial
intervention, the public could label police action as arbitrary, thereby
threatening the integrity of the criminal justice system.
C. The United States Supreme Court's Treatment of Administrative
Searches
Initially, the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment was inapplicable to administrative searches.7" The Court
reasoned that the fourth amendment's protections extended only to
searches conducted pursuant to criminal prosecutions. 79 As govern-
mental regulation increased dramatically, the Court began to change
its position. The Court recognized the strain that surveillance placed
73. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
74. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (citing United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972)).
75. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
76. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565.
77. Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1140.
78. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 90.
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on individuals' privacy rights.80 In Camara v. Municipal Court81 and
See v. City of Seattle, 2 the Court held that the fourth amendment
applied to administrative searches of both homes and commercial
premises, respectively.
1. HOME SEARCHES
3
In Frank v. Maryland,4 the Supreme Court held that administra-
tive searches of homes were not within the purview of the fourth
amendment.8 5 The Court upheld the conviction of a homeowner who
refused to allow city health inspectors to conduct a warrantless
inspection of his basement in order to locate the source of rats.86 The
health inspectors attempted the search pursuant to a city ordinance
that authorized them to demand entry without a warrant.8 7 The
Court justified its decision on the grounds that: (1) the regulatory
inspection "touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the important
interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protections
against official intrusion, ' 88 (2) the inspection was "designed to make
80. "If the government intrudes on a person's property, the privacy interest suffers
whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches
of... regulatory standards." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); cf See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1967).
81. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
82. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
83. Judge Frank recognized the protection that the fourth amendment affords individuals
in their homes in a powerful dissent in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Frank, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): "A sane, decent
civilized society must provide some ... oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some
insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle." Id. at 315-16.
This language was later adopted by the Supreme Court majority in Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 n.4 (1961), which held a warrantless intrusion by police officers into an
apartment unit through the use of an eavesdropping device unconstitutional.
84. 359 U.S. 360, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959), overruled, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
85. Id. at 373.
86. Id. at 361-62.
87. Id. at 361. The city ordinance read:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a
nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in
the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same
and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the
sum of Twenty Dollars.
Id. (quoting BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (n.d.). The trial court found the
homeowner guilty of the offense as alleged in the warrant. Id. On appeal to the Criminal
Court of Baltimore, the homeowner was again found guilty in a de novo proceeding. Id. After
the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari, the homeowner appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 362.
88. Id. at 367. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev'd on other
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the least possible demand on the individual occupant," 9 and (3) the
public interest in maintaining health and safety demanded such an
outcome.90 The Frank holding was subsequently interpreted as carv-
ing out an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.9'
The Supreme Court faced a similar case in Camara v. Municipal
Court,92 where city inspectors cited an apartment lessee for violating
the city's housing code93 because he refused to allow the inspectors to
conduct a warrantless inspection of his home.94 After he was arrested
and had criminal charges filed against him, the lessee sought a writ of
prohibition, which a California Superior Court denied.95 The
Supreme Court held the city ordinance unconstitutional insofar as it
permitted warrantless inspections of the lessee's home.96 In rejecting
the Frank Court's justifications, the Camara Court declared that
"administrative searches of the [home] ... [were] significant intru-
sions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." '97
Moreover, the Court concluded that this regulatory system improp-
grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf insofar as Wolf held the
exclusionary rule inapplicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment). The Supreme
Court modified the application of the exclusionary rule as set forth in Mapp in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
89. Frank, 359 U.S. at 367.
90. Id. The Frank majority embraced the principle that the fourth amendment's
protections extended only to the right to be secure from warrantless searches in the criminal
context. See id. at 365. In the instant case, the health inspectors sought evidence pursuant to
the city regulatory code. See id. at 361-62. Therefore, the Court reasoned that no warrant was
required. See id. at 372-73. In his dissent, Justice Douglas took exception to such a strict
reading of the fourth amendment, arguing that "the Fourth Amendment... has a much wider
frame of reference than mere criminal prosecutions." Id. at 377 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court later embraced Justice Douglas's position sub silentio in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
91. Camara, 387 U.S. at 529 (citing Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, reh'g denied,
364 U.S. 855 (1960)).
92. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
93. The code read:
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be
necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure,
or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the
Municipal Code. •
Id. at 526 (quoting SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HOUSING CODE § 503 (n.d.)).
94. Id. at 526-27.
95. Id. at 525. The California District Court of Appeal affirmed, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1965). The Supreme Court of
California denied a petition for hearing, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967),
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the appellate court's
decision. Id.
96. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
97. Id.
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erly left the lessee at the discretion of the city inspectors. 98 The Court
weighed the public interest by determining whether a departure from
the warrant requirement was necessary. Such a departure depended
on "whether the burden of obtaining a warrant [was] likely to frus-
trate the governmental purpose behind the search." 99 Because no
such burden had been alleged, the Court determined that the public
interest did not justify a deviation from the warrant requirement. °°
2. COMMERCIAL PREMISES SEARCHES
a. See and Barlow's
The Supreme Court extended the fourth amendment's protection
against warrantless administrative searches to business premises in
See v. City of Seattle,1'0 the companion case to Camara. The Court
reversed a warehouse owner's conviction of violating a city ordi-
nance 0 2 by refusing to permit a city fire department field worker to
enter and inspect the owner's locked warehouse for violations of the
municipal fire code. 0 3 The Court refused to leave the decision to
enter and inspect a particular commercial enterprise with agency field
workers, 1°4 and, therefore, held that govermental agencies must
obtain a warrant in order to inspect "portions of commercial premises
which are not open to the public.' 0 5 In this regard, the Court
observed that "the decision to enter and inspect w[ould] not be the
product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the
field." 10 6 Additionally, the Court asserted that a search of private
commercial property was presumptively unreasonable if conducted
without a warrant."0 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied
the fourth amendment limitations on the use of the administrative
98. Id. at 532.
99. Id. at 533 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)).
100. Id.
101. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
102. The ordinance read:
INSPECTIONS OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief
to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of
dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and
causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the
provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.
Id. (quoting SEATTLE, WASH., FIRE CODE § 8.01.050 (n.d.)).
103. Id. at 541-42.
104. Id. at 545.
105. Id.
106. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court would not decide "whether warrants to inspect
business premises may be issued only after access is refused").
107. Id. at 543.
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subpoena. 0 8 Finally, the Court concluded that it would not limit
fourth amendment protections to criminal investigations only. 109
The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc.,' 10 where it held Section 8 of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act"' unconstitutional. Section 8(a) empowered Labor
Department field workers to conduct warrantless searches of work
areas of businesses subject to the Act's provisions'' 2 in order "to
inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations.""' 3
The Barlow's Court reasoned that the decision by a business to engage
in interstate commerce" 4 did not constitute consent to future
searches. "5 Moreover, the Court concluded that a warrant would not
unreasonably burden the Labor Department's enforcement arm." 6
The Court pointed to an existing OSHA regulation that gave compli-
ance officers the option of procuring an administrative subpoena
108. Id. at 545.
109. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the distinction between
criminal investigations conducted on commercial premises and those conducted on residential
premises. It concluded that in previous cases it had "refused to uphold otherwise unreasonable
criminal investigative searches merely because commercial rather than residential premises
were the object of the police intrusions." Id. at 543 (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). The Court then inquired into whether it should
extend such protection to commercial premises when a governmental agency conducted an
administrative rather than a criminal investigation. Id. Finding no justification for
distinguishing between these investigations, the Court held the fourth amendment applicable
to administrative searches of commercial premises.
110. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1988). Section 8(a) read:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where
work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other
reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any
such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines,
apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately
any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.
Id.
112. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 309-10.
113. Id. at 309.
114. The Secretary of Labor argued that businesses engaged in interstate commerce have
always been subjected to close supervision. Id. at 313-14. In essence, this argument called for
the per se extension of the pervasively regulated industries exception to businesses subject to
OSHA.
115. Id. at 314.
116. Id. at 316-20.
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where a business owner had refused entry." 7 This regulation, the
Court surmised, had not inhibited OSHA's effectiveness. 18 The Bar-
low's decision is significant not only because it reaffirmed See's gen-
eral rule that governmental agencies are required to obtain a warrant
prior to inspecting commercial premises, but because it held that
OSHA inspections would not be exempted from that rule." 9
b. The "Pervasively Regulated Industries" Exception
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the warrant require-
ment for administrative searches of commercial premises, it has
carved out exceptions to this rule. One such exception is the "perva-
sively regulated industries" exception. Under this exception, a gov-
ernmental agency need not obtain a search warrant for a search of a
pervasively or closely regulated industry. 120  The pervasively regu-
lated industries exception is relevant to the conflict among the federal
courts of appeals. In McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance,'21 the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the justifications underlying this exception applied to
the OSHA regulations permitting the Labor Department to cite
employers for refusing to comply with warrantless requests for their
safety and health records. 122 Of course, other exceptions are applica-
ble in the administrative inspections context. These include: (1) emer-
gency situations,' 2 (2) consent,1 24 and (3) "where the object of the
inspection is open to public view. '"125
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,126 the Supreme
Court concluded that the pervasively regulated industries exception
was justified by a long tradition of close governmental supervision and
regulation. 27 Businesses historically subject to intense regulation,
117. Id. at 317-18.
118. Id. at 318.
119. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 210-22 (1978).
120. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
Rothstein and Rothstein argue that the See Court laid the foundation for this exception in
its language that licensing inspections were valid. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 15, at
358-59 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967)).
When the pervasively regulated industries exception applies, business owners retain
reduced privacy expectations, and governmental agencies must satisfy the fourth amendment
reasonableness requirement. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying notes.
121. 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 727.
123. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); see Rothstein & Rothstein,
supra note 15, at 351-53.
124. See, 387 U.S. at 545; see Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 15, at 353-58.
125. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 15, at 366 (discussing See, 387 U.S. at 545).
126. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
127. Id. at 77.
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such as federally licensed sellers of alcoholic beverages, could be sub-
jected to warrantless inspections.' 28 Since Colonnade, the Court has
extended the application of the pervasively regulated industries excep-
tion to businesses that traditionally have not been subject to close gov-
ernmental supervision. 29
In United States v. Biswell,1 30 for example, the Court applied the
pervasively regulated industries exception to the firearms industry.13'
The Court could not base its decision on the Colonnade rationale
because federal regulation of interstate traffic in firearms was not as
historic as regulation of the liquor industry. 32 Rather, the Court ana-
lyzed the benefits of close governmental supervision of the firearms
industry, and concluded that in order for the law to be properly
enforced, warrantless searches were necessary. 33 This law enforce-
ment need, coupled with the minimal possibility of governmental
abuse, motivated the Court to hold that the statutorily authorized
warrantless inspections were reasonable under the fourth
amendment. 134
In Donovan v. Dewey, 35 the Court upheld warrantless inspec-
tions authorized by Section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977.136 The Court expressly recognized that the
length of time of governmental supervision alone would not be dispos-
128. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately disapproved the search conducted in the case
"because the statute provided that a sanction be imposed when entry was refused, and because
it did not authorize entry without a warrant as an alternative." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691, 700 (1987).
129. See infra notes 130-51 and accompanying text.
130. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
131. Id. at 315-17. In Biswell, the firearm statute authorized "official entry during business
hours into 'the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition ... dealer
... for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be
kept ... and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such ... dealer ... at such
premises.'" Id. at 311 (quoting Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat.
1213, 1223 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1988))).
132. Id. at 315.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 317.
135. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
136. Pub. L. No. 95-164, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1291 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1988)).
According to the Court in Dewey:
[The Act] provide[d] that federal mine inspectors [were] to inspect underground
mines at least four times per year and surface mines at least twice a year to insure
compliance with ... standards [promulgated by the Secretary of Labor], and to
make followup inspections .... [Section 103(a) of the Act] . . . also grant[ed]
mine operators "a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal or other mine"
and state[d] that "no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any
person."
Dewey, 452 U.S. at 596 (footnote omitted).
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itive of whether a particular business was subject to the pervasively
regulated industries exception. 137 Rather, the pervasiveness and regu-
larity of governmental regulation would be the deciding factor.138 In
interpreting Colonnade and Biswell, the Court stated:
[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress
has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary
to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence
is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of com-
mercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be
subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes. 13 9
Accordingly, an individual owning a business in a pervasively regu-
lated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy; 140 thus, federal
mine inspectors did not have to obtain a search warrant to conduct
inspections under the applicable statutory scheme. 4 ' Finally, the
Court concluded that the statute provided an adequate substitute for
the warrant requirement, 42 because it provided safeguards for mine
operators,1 43 and, therefore, was reasonable.
More recently, in New York v. Burger,'" the Court held that
police agency searches of junkyards that dismantled vehicles, con-
ducted pursuant to state regulations, 145 fell within the pervasively reg-
ulated industries exception. 4 6 Several premises supported the Court's
conclusion: (1) the junkyard industry was closely regulated by the
state, 47 (2) automobile dismantlers were subject to extensive regula-
137. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 606.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 600.
140. Id. at 599-600.
141. Id. at 606.
142. The Supreme Court focused on the certainty and regularity of the Act's inspection
program. Id. at 603-05.
143. The Supreme Court held that the statute provided an adequate substitute for a warrant
because "the Act requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of
inspection," "the standards with which a mine operator is required to comply are all
specifically set forth in the Act or ... [in the regulations]," and "the Act provides a special
mechanism for accommodating any special privacy concerns that a specific mine operator
might have." Id. at 603-04.
144. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
145. The state statute provided that:
Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any police officer and during
his regular and usual business hours, a vehicle dismantler shall produce such
records and permit said agent or police officer to examine them and any vehicles
or parts of vehicles which are subject to the record keeping requirements of this
section and which are on the premises.
Id. at 694 n.l (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5(a) (McKinney 1986)).
146. Id. at 703.
147. Id. at 703-04.
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tion, ' and (3) automobile dismantlers were part of the general
junkyard industry. 49 The Court concluded that "an operator of a
junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling ha[d] a reduced expectation
of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business."' 50 Therefore, the
police agency did not have to obtain a search warrant in order to
satisfy the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement.,
These cases indicate that the basis for the pervasively regulated
industries exception is not that a business owner does not have any
reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial property and that,
therefore, the fourth amendment is not applicable because no search
has occurred. 5 2 If this were the case, the fourth amendment reasona-
bleness question would be irrelevant. 53 On the contrary, even in this
context, the Court has inquired into whether the statutory scheme
was reasonable." 4 Admittedly, the warrant requirement has a less-
ened application in this context."' The Court, however, has recog-
nized that expectations of privacy are at stake, albeit reduced ones.' 56
c. The Burger Framework
Burger is valuable for its analysis of the fourth amendment's rea-
sonableness requirement. The Burger Court's framework is applica-
ble in determining whether the Labor Department may, without a
warrant or administrative subpoena, constitutionally cite employers
who refuse to provide safety and health records upon demand. The
Court first asked whether a search warrant was not required because
the pervasively regulated industries exception applied.' 57 Because the
exception did apply, no search warrant was necessary.1 58 With that in
mind, the Court then analyzed whether the warrantless inspections
148. Id.
149. Id. at 703-04, 706.
150. Id. at 707.
151. The Court then concluded that the warrantless inspections were reasonable under the
fourth amendment. For an extensive analysis of Burger, see infra notes 157-64 and
accompanying text.
152. Whether a governmental agency's conduct constitutes a search under the fourth
amendment depends on a business owner's reasonable expectation of privacy. If the business
owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy, the agency's conduct does not constitute a
search. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
153. The fourth amendment is only implicated if there is a search. If there is a search, a
governmental agency's conduct must meet the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement.
See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
154. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 703-08.
158. Id. at 702.
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authorized by the statutory scheme were reasonable under the fourth
amendment. 159 In the context of the pervasively regulated industries
exception or "where the privacy interest of the owner are weakened
and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are
concomitantly heightened,"' governmental agencies must satisfy a
three-tiered standard in order for the scheme at issue to be constitu-
tional. The three criteria are: (1) "there must be a 'substantial' gov-
ernment interest that informs the regulatory scheme to which the
inspection is made," 161 (2) the inspections conducted pursuant to the
statute "must 'be necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme,' "162
and (3) "the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions
of a warrant: it must advise the owner ... that the search is being
made pursuant to law and has a properly defined scope, and it must
limit the discretion of the inspecting officers." 163 The Court held that
because the state's regulatory statute met all three criteria, it was rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment. 16
III. THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS IN CONFLICT
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits have confronted the issue of the constitutionality of
the OSHA regulations requiring business owners to voluntarily pro-
duce safety and health records. 165  An analysis of these cases illus-
trates the tension existing between a business owner's constitutional
159. Id. at 708.
160. Id. at 702. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deemed this
language as providing for an exception to the general warrant requirement rule in McLaughlin
v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1988).
161. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 703.
164. Id. at 708. The Court concluded that the statute met the first criterion because "motor
vehicle theft ha[d] increased in the State and because the problem of theft [was] associated with
th[e automobile junkyard] industry." Id. As to the second criterion, the Court noted that "the
State rationally may believe that it will reduce car theft by regulations that prevent automobile
junkyards from becoming markets for stolen vehicles," id. at 709, and that warrantless
inspections [were] necessary to further the statutory scheme, id. at 710 (citing Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)). Lastly, the Court determined that the statute met the third
criterion because it properly notified business owners of the regularity of the searches and
sufficiently limited inspectors' discretion. Id. at 711.
For a recent analysis of the three Burger factors, see Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dep't of
Transp., 687 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Ruiz court stated that it was not relying on
the pervasively regulated industries exception to uphold the warrantless searches and seizures
at issue. Id. at 894 n.8. It used the exception, however, to shed light on the controversy
stemming from state regulations permitting warrantless stops of trucks. Id.
165. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988); McLaughlin v. A.B.
Chance, 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988); Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir.
1987).
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right to be free from warrantless searches and the government's dis-
cretionary power. As the following discussion will show, the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits correctly concluded that the OSHA regulations
were invalid to the extent that they permitted compliance officers to
conduct warrantless searches. The Fourth Circuit, however, incor-
rectly upheld the OSHA regulations without even considering the
Supreme Court's framework for testing the reasonableness of war-
rantless inspections set out in Burger.
A. The OSHA Regulatory Scheme
In its enactment of OSHA,'66 Congress provided for the imple-
mentation of appropriate recordkeeping procedures 167 by the Secre-
tary of Labor, who was given the express authority to "prescribe
regulations requiring employers to maintain accurate records of, and
to make periodic reports on, work-related deaths, injuries and ill-
nesses."1 68  Regulations promulgated pursuant to this statutory grant
of authority are at issue in the three federal courts of appeals cases to
be examined. 69
The OSHA recordkeeping regulations require employers to
maintain in their business premises both a log and supplemental rec-
ord of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses. 170 Addition-
166. In passing OSHA, Congress declared that OSHA's purpose was "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
167. Id. § 651(b)(12).
168.. Id. § 657(c)(2).
169. The regulations forming the regulatory framework in the three cases are: Recording
and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1904.1-1904.7 (1989). These
regulations were promulgated as "necessary or appropriate for enforcement of... [OSHA], for
developing information regarding the causes of and prevention of occupational accidents and
illnesses, and for maintaining a program of collection, compilation, and analysis of
occupational safety and health statistics." Id. § 1904.1.
170. Id. §§ 1904.2(a)(1), 1904.4. Section 1904.2 provides:
(a) Each employer shall, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
(1) maintain in each establishment a log and summary of all recordable
occupational injuries and illnesses for that establishment; and (2) enter each
recordable injury and illness on the log and summary as early as practicable but
no later than 6 working days after receiving information that a recordable injury
or illness has occurred. For this purpose form OSHA No. 200 or an equivalent
which is as readable and comprehensible to a person not familiar with it shall be
used. The log and summary shall be completed in the detail provided in the form
and instructions on form OSHA No. 200.
(b) Any employer may maintain the log of occupational injuries and
illnesses at a place other than the establishment or by means of data-processing
equipment, or both, under the following circumstances:
(1) There is available at the place where the log is maintained sufficient
information to complete the log to a date within 6 working days after receiving
[Vol. 45:201
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ally, employers are required to post an annual compilation of all
occupational injuries and illnesses for each of their establishments. 71
information that a recordable case has occurred, as required by paragraph (a) of
this section.
(2) At each of the employer's establishments, there is available a copy of the
log which reflects separately the injury and illness experience of that
establishment complete and current to a date within 45 calendar days.
Id. § 1904.2.
Section 1904.4 provides:
In addition to the log of occupational injuries and illnesses provided for
under § 1904.2, each employer shall have available for inspection at each estab-
lishment within 6 working days after receiving information that a recordable case
has occurred, a supplementary record for each occupational injury or illness for
that establishment. The record shall be completed in the detail prescribed in the
instructions accompanying Occupational Safety and Health Administration form
OSHA No. 101. Workmen's compensation, insurance, or other reports are
acceptable alternative records if they contain the information required by Form
OSHA No. 101. If no acceptable alternative record is maintained for other pur-
poses, Form OSHA No. 101 shall be used or the necessary information shall be
otherwise maintained.
Id. § 1904.4.
171. Id. § 1904.5. Section 1904.5 provides:
(a) Each employer shall post an annual summary of occupational injuries
and illnesses for each establishment. This summary shall consist of a copy of the
year's totals from the form OSHA No. 200 and the following information from
that form: Calendar year covered, company Name[,] establishment name,
establishment address, certification signature, title, and date. A form OSHA No.
200 shall be used in presenting the summary. If no injuries or illnesses occurred
in the year, zeros must be entered on the totals line, and the form must be posted.
(b) The summary shall be completed by February 1 beginning with calendar
year 1979. The summary of 1977 calendar year's occupational injuries and
illnesses shall be posted on form OSHA No. 102.
(c) Each employer, or the officer or employee of the employer who
supervises the preparation of the log and summary of occupational injuries and
illnesses, shall certify that the annual summary of occupational injuries is true
and complete. The certification shall be accomplished by affixing the signature of
the employer, or the officer or employer who supervises the preparation of the
annual summary of occupational injuries and illnesses, at the bottom of the last
page of the log and summary or by appending a separate statement to the log and
summary certifying that the summary is true and complete.
(d) (1) Each employer shall post a copy of the establishment's summary in
each establishment in the same manner that notices are required to be posted
under § 1903.2(a)(1) of this chapter. The summary covering the previous
calendar year shall be posted no later than February 1, and shall remain in place
until March 1. For employees who do not primarily report or work at a single
establishment, or who do not report to any fixed establishment on a regular basis,
employers shall satisfy this posting requirement by presenting or mailing a copy
of the summary during the month of February of the following year to each such
employee who receives pay during that month. For multi-establishment
employers where operations have closed down in some establishments during the
calendar year, it will not be necessary to post summaries for those
establishments.
(2) A failure to post a copy of the establishment's annual summary may
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Employers must satisfy this requirement even if there have been no
injuries or illnesses during the preceding year. 172  Because such
records would be of minimal or no value to the Labor Department if
it did not have access to them, Section 1904.7(a) of the regulations
mandates that "[e]ach employer shall provide, upon request, [the
safety and health] records . . ., for inspection and copying by any
representative of the Secretary of Labor for the purpose of carrying
out the provisions of the act."'73  It is the constitutionality of this
regulation that is in question in each of the federal cases because it
does not require that compliance officers seek compulsory process.
Compliance officers, however, do have the option to seek compulsory
process. 174
B. The Factual Sequence
Each of the federal cases under review was initiated when an
employee filed a complaint with the Labor Department against his or
result in the issuance of citations and assessment of penalties pursuant to sections
9 and 17 of the Act.
Id.
172. M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 200 (2d ed. 1983).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a) (1989). This Section provides:
(a) Each employer shall provide, upon request, records provided for in
§§ 1904.2, 1904.4, and 1904.5, for inspection and copying by any representative
of the Secretary of Labor for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
act, and by representatives of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
during any investigation under section 20(b) of the act, or by any representative
of a State accorded jurisdiction for occupational safety and health inspections or
for statistical compilation under sections 18 and 24 of the act.
(b) (1) The log and summary of all recordable occupational injuries and
illnesses (OSHA No. 200) (the log) provided for in § 1904.2 shall, upon request,
be made available by the employer to any employee, former employee, and to
their representatives for examination and copying in a reasonable manner and at
reasonable times. The employee, former employee, and their representatives
shall have access to the log for any establishment in which the employee is or has
been employed.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude employees and
employee representatives from collectively bargaining to obtain access to
information relating to occupational injuries and illnesses in addition to the
information made available under this section.
(3) Access to the log provided under this section shall pertain to all logs
retained under the requirements of § 1904.6.
Id.
For implementation purposes, the OSHA Operations Manual provides that a compliance
officer shall issue a citation to employers who fail to provide safety and health records. OSHA
Field Operations Man. (BNA) ch. VI(B)(8)(e) (1989).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a)-(b) (1989). Section 1903.4(d) defines compulsory process as
"the institution of any appropriate action, including ex parte application for an inspection
warrant or its equivalent," id. § 1903.4(d), and establishes exparte inspection warrants as "the
preferred form of compulsory process," id.
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her respective employer.'75  In McLaughlin v. Kings Island,7 6 for
example, the employee filed a "health complaint alleging that fog used
in a theatrical performance at the theme park [operated by Kings
Island] irritated employees' eyes and upper respiratory systems." '177
The Labor Department subsequently sent OSHA compliance officers
to the respective employers' business premises to investigate the
claims. 178
In Brock v. Emerson Electric Co., 71 when a compliance officer
visited the Emerson Electric plant in response to an employee health
complaint, 80 he sought permission to inspect the workplace and to
examine the company's safety and health records for the period cover-
ing 1982 through 1984.181 Emerson's personnel manager permitted
the compliance officer to conduct a warrantless search of the work-
place, but refused to allow him to inspect the requested records with-
out a warrant or subpoena. 82 Consequently, the Secretary of Labor
issued Emerson Electric a citation for violating Section 1904.7.183
Similarly in Kings Island, a compliance officer requested permis-
sion to examine the employer's safety and health records for the pre-
ceding three years, 84 so he could examine the documents for hygienic
and environmental problems.' 85 The compliance officer did not pres-
ent either a search warrant or an administrative subpoena. 86 Kings
Island informed the compliance officer that it would permit only an
inspection of the business premises and the records relevant to the
scope of the employee complaint. 87 It also indicated that it would
produce no other records unless the compliance officer obtained a
175. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 991-92 (6th Cir. 1988); McLaughlin v.
A.B. Chance Co., 842 F.2d 724, 724 (4th Cir. 1988); Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d
994, 995 (11th Cir. 1987).
176. 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988).
177. Id. at 991-92.
178. Id.; A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 724; Emerson, 834 F.2d at 995.
179. 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).
180. Id. at 995.
181. Id. at 995-96.
182. Id. at 996.
183. Id. Emerson contested the citation. Id. However, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) vacated the citation on the ground that Emerson had a fourth amendment right to insist
on a search warrant or subpoena. Secretary of Labor v. Emerson Elec. Co., 13 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1171, 1172 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar. 18, 1987). The Occupational Safety and
Review Commission (OSHRC) affirmed, based on its earlier holding in the Kings Island case.
Id. The Secretary of Labor petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review. Emerson, 834 F.2d at
996.
184. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 900, 992 (6th Cir. 1988).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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search warrant or some other form of legal process. 18 In response,
the Secretary of Labor cited Kings Island for not providing the
records upon request.18 9
Finally, in McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance Co. 190 a compliance
officer requested that A.B. Chance produce its safety and health
records,' 9 as well as permission to examine the machinery that an
employee had cited in his health complaint.' 92 An A.B. Chance rep-
resentative allowed the compliance officer to examine the machinery,
but on two occasions refused to produce the records. 193 Accordingly,
the compliance officer gave notice to the company "of its violation of
... [OSHA], and regulations promulgated thereunder, particularly 29
C.F.R. § 1904.7(a)."' 194 In neither instance did the compliance officer
attempt to obtain a warrant or an administrative subpoena.'95
C. Emerson: The Eleventh Circuit Finds the OSHA Regulations
Unconstitutional
The core of the Brock v. Emerson 196 decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consisted of two
inquiries addressing the constitutionality of Section 1904.7: (1)
whether Emerson had a privacy interest in the OSHA safety and
health records, and if so, (2) the extent of the fourth amendment pro-
tection to be given this privacy interest. " Beginning with the prem-
188. Id.
189. Id. Like Emerson, Kings Island contested the citation. Id. The AJ granted the
Labor Department's motion for summary judgment and found that Kings Island was in
violation of the OSHA regulations for its failure to provide the requested records. Secretary of
Labor v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1137, 1138 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar.
18, 1987).
Kings Island subsequently petitioned the OSHRC for a review of the ALJ's holding. Id.
The OSHRC reversed the ALJ's decision, holding that Section 1904.7(a) violated the fourth
amendment "to the extent that it purports to authorize an inspection of required records
without a warrant or its 'equivalent.'" Id. at 1146. Thereafter, the Secretary of Labor
petitioned the Sixth Circuit for review. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 992.
190. 834 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 724-25.
194. Id. at 725.
195. The Secretary of Labor sought to enforce the citation. Id. Applying established fourth
amendment analysis, see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text, the ALJ concluded that
the fourth amendment did not require OSHA to obtain a warrant or to issue a subpoena when
it desired to inspect safety and health records. Secretary of Labor v. A.B. Chance Co., 12
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1172, 1173 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar. 18, 1987). On appeal, the OSHRC
reversed, in light of its prior holding in Kings Island. Id. The Secretary petitioned the Fourth
Circuit for review. A.B. Chance, 834 F.2d at 725.
196. 834 F.2d 994 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
197. Id. at 996.
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ise that individuals have a protected interest in commercial property,
the court observed that the pervasively regulated industries exception
did not apply to Emerson.19 The fact that many employers kept
safety and health records prior to the passage of OSHA supported the
argument that Emerson had an expectation of privacy in the
records. 199 Moreover, this privacy interest was not lessened by Con-
gress' enactment of OSHA and the Labor Department's subsequent
promulgation of regulations mandating that all employers subject to
OSHA compile such records.2 °° Consequently, the court concluded
that Emerson had a privacy interest in its records.201
The Eleventh Circuit then defined the contours of the protections
afforded to Emerson's privacy interest.20 2 Utilizing the Supreme
Court's analysis in See pertaining to the use of administrative subpoe-
nas,20 1 the Emerson court concluded that judicial oversight in the
commercial context was indispensable to curbing the government's
discretion to invade a company's privacy.2" Accordingly, the court
held that an employer such as Emerson could demand that the Labor
Department "issue a subpoena and [could] seek judicial involvement
by refusing to honor the subpoena prior to its judicial enforce-
ment." 205 Thus, the court held Section 1904.7 unconstitutional under
the fourth amendment to the extent that this regulation authorized
inspections of the records without a warrant or subpoena. 2°
In essence, the Eleventh Circuit's decision is consistent with the
Burger framework.20 7 The Emerson court first recognized that busi-
ness owners have protected privacy interests in commercial prop-
erty,20 8 and then concluded that such interests attached to Emerson's
safety and health records. 209 Therefore, the Emerson court surmised,
some degree of judicial intervention was necessary prior to inspection.
It is of no consequence that the court did not analyze the constitution-
198. Id. Like the conclusions reached in Barlow's and Kings Island, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Emerson was not within the exception merely because it was within the scope
of OSHA. Id. (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1978)); see also Kings
Island, 849 F.2d at 994 (citing Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 315).
199. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 996.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
204. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 997.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. For a discussion of Burger's analysis of the reasonableness requirement, see supra notes
157-64 and accompanying text.
208. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 996.
209. Id. at 996-97.
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ality of the OSHA regulations, assuming that the Labor Department
could establish decreased privacy expectations. Because the court
concluded that Emerson retained its privacy interests in the records
and that some sort of judicial intervention was required, the court did
not have to reach that constitutional issue.
D. Kings Island: The Sixth Circuit Aligns with the Eleventh
Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
McLaughlin v. Kings Island,210 also utilized the holding of See in
determining whether the OSHA regulations were constitutional to the
extent that they permitted warrantless searches of employers' safety
and health records.21 ' As discussed earlier,21 2 See held that absent the
existence of an exception, governmental agencies must obtain a war-
rant in order for a search of commercial premises to be deemed rea-
sonable.21 3 Because the Sixth Circuit found that an exception did not
exist,21 4 the Labor Department had to establish that Kings Island had
a decreased privacy expectation overshadowed by governmental regu-
latory interests in order to prevail on the merits.215
The Labor Department argued that Kings Island had a minimal
expectation of privacy in the requested records because such records
were required to be maintained and produced by law.216 In address-
ing this argument, the Sixth Circuit employed a two-fold mode of
analysis. The court first admitted that other courts had repeatedly
upheld access to records based on the government's request for
them.21 7 It noted, however, that in those prior cases some judicial
intervention was present prior to the search.218 Whether or not a war-
210. 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988).
211. Id. at 993.
212. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
213. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967)). Like the See Court, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that an administrative
subpoena may be adequate in certain circumstances. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 993 (citing See,
387 U.S. at 544-45).
214. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 994-96. The Labor Department conceded that the
pervasively regulated industries exception was inapplicable. Id. at 994. It acknowledged that
the exception was limited and that "industries affected by OSHA are not by definition
pervasively regulated." Id.
The Labor Department could not establish consent because Kings Island had not agreed
to the inspection of the records. Id. at 992. Additionally, an emergency situation presumably
did not exist, and the records were not in plain view.
215. Id. at 994.
216. Id. at 995.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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rant was ultimately required was not dispositive of the issue in those
cases because the presence of the judiciary prevented arbitrary deci-
sionmaking by agency field workers.21 9 In contrast, Kings Island did
"not involve a contested search warrant...; an administrative sub-
poena.. .; access by injunction or court order...; a pervasively regu-
lated industry ... ; a regulatory reporting requirement ... ; or access
pursuant to any consent order or contract with the federal govern-
ment."220 Rather, what transpired was "an unannounced inspection
accompanied by an arbitrary and discretionary demand to inspect
company records not only as they relate[d] to a specific [employee
health] complaint, but for hygienic and environmental problems in
general." '221 Such a governmental intrusion could not be constitu-
tional because it was contrary both to the rule established in See2 2 2
and to the policies served by a search warrant.223
The court then focused on whether an employer had a privacy
expectation in records required by regulation to be maintained.224 In
this regard, the Sixth Circuit expressly concurred with the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Emerson, and held that employers have recogniz-
able privacy interests in OSHA safety and health records even though
employers are required to maintain them.225 The court recognized
that an employer may keep the safety and health records for any
number of business reasons, including preserving the lives and health
of employees, raising the labor force's morale, and obtaining lower
insurance rates.226 As such, the records were not of interest solely to
the Labor Department; nor were they public property.227 Therefore,
the court reasoned that Kings Island had a privacy interest in its
records that should be protected by judicial oversight through either a
search warrant or an administrative subpoena. 228
219. See id.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Id.
222. For a discussion of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1987), see supra notes 101-09
and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the purposes served by a search warrant, see supra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text.
224. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 995.
225. Id. (citing Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 994 (1 1th Cir. 1987)).
226. Secretary of Labor v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1137, 1140
(O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar. 18, 1987), aff'd, McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th
Cir. 1988).
227. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 995 (quoting United States v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 667
F.2d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982); and citing C.A.B. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stanock Sales Co., 387 F.2d 849
(3rd Cir. 1968); and Mid-Fla. Coin Exch., Inc. v. Griffin, 529 F. Supp. 1006 (M.D. Fla. 1981)).
228. Id. at 996.
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In discussing the need for a warrant or an administrative sub-
poena, the Sixth Circuit adopted a reasoning similar to that used by
the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc..229 It noted that
although the fourth amendment limited the Labor Department's abil-
ity to obtain documents, requiring at least an administrative subpoena
would not impose unreasonable burdens on the Labor Department's
enforcement arm.23° Under the OSHA regulations, a compliance
officer had the option of choosing whether to obtain an administrative
subpoena or to perform a warrantless search.23' Inconsistent results
could obtain under this procedure because the fourth amendment's
reasonableness requirement would apply only when the compliance
officer chose to obtain a subpoena.232 These concerns, coupled with
the need to define the scope of the search and to afford employers
notice and an opportunity to be heard,233 led the Sixth Circuit to hold
that judicial oversight was necessary before OSHA could demand
production of the safety and health records.2 34
Utilizing the framework of New York v. Burger,235 the Sixth Cir-
cuit assumed that the Labor Department could establish that Kings
Island had a reduced expectation of privacy in its safety and health
records.236 Next, it considered whether the OSHA regulatory scheme
satisfied Burger's three-tiered reasonableness test.237 Because the reg-
ulatory scheme failed the second and third criteria of the test, the
Sixth Circuit held that the regulations permitting the warrantless
searches were unconstitutional. 23' As to the second criterion, the
Labor Department contended that requiring a warrant or a subpoena
for the production of the safety and health records would be burden-
some on both the agency and the federal courts.239 Following the
Supreme Court's lead in Camara, the Sixth Circuit demanded that the
Labor Department demonstrate that warrantless searches were neces-
sary for the reasonable enforcement of OSHA.240 The Labor Depart-
229. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). For a discussion of Barlow's, see supra notes 110-19 and
accompanying text.
230. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 996.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 997.
235. 482 U.S. 691 :(1987). For a discussion of Burger, see supra notes 144-64 and
accompanying text.
236. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 996.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 997.
240. Id.
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ment was unable to do SO. 24 1
Regarding the third criterion of the Burger test, the Labor
Department alleged that the OSHA regulations adequately limited
compliance officer discretion, and protected employers' privacy inter-
ests.242 For instance, the regulations granted employers procedural
safeguards, and the Labor Department could not imposed monetary
penalties for failure to provide records until the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission affirmed the reasonableness of the
citation.24
3
The Sixth Circuit countered this argument, however, by invoking
the language from Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.2 " that "a provision
authorizing warrantless administrative inspections 'devolves almost
unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers,' ",245
which contravenes the purposes served by a warrant. 246 Here, the
OSHA regulations required an employer like Kings Island to refuse to
produce the records and then to defend itself after receiving a cita-
tion.247 These "after the fact" procedures conflicted with a business
owner's fourth amendment rights because the judiciary could not
evaluate the reasonableness of the compliance officer's demand until
the harm had been done. 248
In sum, the Sixth Circuit held that even if the Labor Department
had established King Island's reduced expectation of privacy, the
OSHA regulations in question were unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. 249 The Labor Department could neither establish that
the warrantless inspections were essential to furthering the regulatory
scheme, or that the regulatory scheme provided an adequate substi-
tute for a search warrant. In essence, the regulatory scheme was
unreasonable because it did not safeguard the policies served by a
search warrant.
E. A.B. Chance: The Fourth Circuit Takes a Different Route
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance confronted the constitutionality of the
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
245. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997 (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323).
246. For a discussion of the purposes served by a search warrant, see supra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text.
247. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 998.
250. 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
OSHA regulations with an analytic framework similar to that of the
Eleventh Circuit's Emerson decision. 251  Although it began its ana-
lytic trek with the familiar inquiry of whether A.B. Chance had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the OSHA records,2 52 the Fourth
Circuit reached a result contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit.
After recognizing the general rule that a warrant is required for
administrative searches of business premises,253 the Fourth Circuit
disclosed that in certain circumstances a regulatory scheme authoriz-
ing warrantless searches may adequately protect a business owner's
privacy expectations.254 Such a regulatory scheme must meet the
fourth amendment's reasonableness standard to be constitutional. 255
Rejecting A.B. Chance's argument that a search warrant was required
in this context because A.B. Chance was not engaged in a pervasively
regulated industry,256 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the rationale
of the pervasively regulated industries exception was applicable.257
Because OSHA required the records to be kept, business owners were
on notice that such records might be examined and, therefore, their
expectation of privacy was diminished.258
In determining whether the OSHA regulatory scheme was rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment, the Fourth Circuit balanced
"the need to search against the invasion which the search
entail[ed] .- 259 The Fourth Circuit first considered the Labor Depart-
ment's need to conduct warrantless searches for safety and health
records; and pointed to congressional intent to support the position
that a strong enforcement scheme was necessary to fulfill OSHA's
purposes. 2" To this extent, "the keeping of records by employers to
show all industrial accidents, injuries, and illnesses occurring at the
work place is a reasonable and necessary requirement in order for the
Act to be properly administered and enforced."'26 ' In sum, the Labor
Department's need to search was a compelling one.
The court concluded that the invasion which the warrantless
251. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
252. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 726.
253. Id. (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)).
254. Id. at 727 (quoting Gallaher v. City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155, 1159 (4th Cir.
1985) (quoting Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir.
1983))).
255. Id. (quoting Gallaher, 759 F.2d at 1159 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967))).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988)).
261. Id.
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search occasioned was minimal.262 The court enunciated five justifica-
tions for this conclusion. First, a compliance officer's request for the
records did not place an inordinate burden on A.B. Chance.2 63 The
company only needed to physically produce the records, which it
already should have compiled.2 This sort of an invasion was, there-
fore quite minimal.265
Second, A.B. Chance had a minimal privacy expectation in the
records requested.266 Pursuant to OSHA regulations, A.B. Chance
was required to post "an annual summary of occupational injuries
and illnesses, which... consist[ed] of a copy of the year's totals from
form No. 200... in a conspicuous place.., where notices to employ-
ees [we]re customarily posted. '267 Since this information was accessi-
ble to anyone viewing A.B. Chance's bulletin board, the Fourth
Circuit determined that A.B. Chance had a negligible expectation of
privacy in the records.268
Third, a compliance officer's request for the production of the
records was not unreasonable.2 69 The compliance officer was on the
business premises as a result of an employee health complaint. The
court surmised that it was not unreasonable for the officer to request
that A.B. Chance produce the records while he was on the premises
because the information they contained could have related to the alle-
gations in the health complaint, 270 and, in any event, the regulation
required the employer to keep this information.271
Fourth, the Labor Department did not arbitrarily decide to
search A.B. Chance's records. 272 Invoking Barlow's, A.B. Chance
argued that allowing the warrantless search would devolve too much
discretion on compliance officers. 273 However, the Fourth Circuit dis-
tinguished Barlow's by positing that A.B. Chance had been selected
for search as result of an employee health complaint-not because of
"whim, caprice, or any arbitrary method. ' 274
The final justification centered around the Fourth Circuit's cri-
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 727-28.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 728.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978)).
274. Id.
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tique of the Emerson holding.27 The Fourth Circuit alleged that the
Eleventh Circuit failed to address the question of whether the com-
pany's expectation of privacy was reasonable and to engage in a bal-
ancing test to determine the reasonableness of the regulatory
scheme.276 Regarding the reasonableness of the company's expecta-
tion of privacy, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its argument concerning
the posting of an annual summary of injuries and determined that
there was "no reason to conclude that an employer's privacy expecta-
tion in the forms, or in the information contained thereon, [was]
greater at the time OSHA requested the documents, than it [was] at
the time the annual summary [was] posted. '277 In response to the
Eleventh Circuit's argument that many employers kept such records
prior to OSHA's enactment, the Fourth Circuit argued that there was
no indication that A.B. Chance kept such records2 7' and that, in any
event, "by promulgating the record requirement, OSHA cannot be
deemed to have created a privacy interest in the information con-
tained on the forms. 279
Concerning the failure of the Eleventh Circuit to implement a
balancing test, the Fourth Circuit argued that the Emerson court did
not address the limitations on the compliance officer's discretion. 28 0
The compliance officer could only request two types of forms without
a warrant.28 ' Moreover, the Fourth Circuit concluded that in order
to make such a request, the compliance officer "must be on the
employer's premises as a result of an employee's health or safety com-
plaint before he may require production of the forms ... without a
warrant. '2 2 Because of this judicial condition, the Fourth Circuit
implied that the compliance officer's discretion was limited and ulti-
275. Id.
276. Id. This allegation may be misplaced. In fact, as previously noted, the Eleventh
Circuit began its inquiry into the constitutionality of the OSHA regulations with the question
of whether the employer had an expectation of privacy in the records. Brock v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 (1 1th Cir. 1987). Arguably, the court made its determination from the
reasonableness perspective. Concerning the balancing test issue, the Eleventh Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit employed different methodologies. The Eleventh Circuit's methodology
paralleled the Supreme Court's in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The Fourth
Circuit's methodology was consistent with the methodology that courts frequently have
employed in the administrative searches context. See Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1129-33.
As will be argued, the Fourth Circuit's approach was incorrect because it was inconsistent
with See and did not account for the three-tiered Burger reasonableness test. See infra notes
285-90 and accompanying text.
277. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 728.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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mately held that the regulatory scheme was reasonable under the
fourth amendment. 2 a Therefore, A.B. Chance could be cited for not
voluntarily producing the records.28 4
IV. RESOLUTION UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The judicial treatment of administrative searches in the commer-
cial context indicates that business owners have privacy interests that
are protected by the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has
established that a search warrant or an administrative subpoena is
necessary for an administrative search to be held reasonable and,
therefore, constitutional under the fourth amendment.28 5 Where the
Supreme Court has recognized the pervasively regulated industries
exception,286 it has inquired into whether the statutory scheme per-
mitting the warrantless searches was reasonable.28 7 In essence, the
issue is whether the policies served by a search warrant are safe-
guarded by the statutory scheme.
The preceding Section disclosed the Fourth Circuit's legal analy-
sis in A.B. Chance, where it upheld the OSHA regulations permitting
warrantless searches of employer safety and health records.288 As a
result, the Labor Department could cite A.B. Chance for violating
OSHA when it did not produce the records upon a compliance
officer's request.289 This Comment argues that the A.B. Chance hold-
ing was incorrect in light of the precedent established by See and Bar-
low's, the Fourth Circuit's use of a balancing test, and prevailing
public policy concerns. Accordingly, an alternate mode of resolving
these issues is presented based on the Sixth Circuit's use of the New
York v. Burger29 ° decision.
A. A Critique of the Fourth Circuit's Rationale in A.B. Chance
The Fourth Circuit employed a balancing test in holding that the
OSHA regulations permitting warrantless searches of employers'
safety and health records satisfied the fourth amendment reasonable-
ness requirement. 29 ' The court's holding permitted OSHA compli-
283. Id. at 728-29.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 250-84 and accompanying text.
289. McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724, 728-29 (4th Cir. 1988).
290. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). For the Sixth Circuit's application of the Burger test, see supra
notes 235-49.
291. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 727-29.
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ance officers to cite employers who did not voluntarily produce the
requested records. This Comment critiques the A.B. Chance court's
analytic framework on the aforementioned grounds.
First, See and Barlow's both support the principle that a warrant
is required for administrative searches of commercial premises to be
deemed reasonable under the fourth amendment.292 These cases rec-
ognize the need to interpose a judicial organ between businessmen and
agency fieldworkers. 293 The Fourth Circuit disregarded these prece-
dents in holding that an employer cannot demand that a compliance
officer present a warrant or an administrative subpoena. Even though
it referred briefly to the See general rule,294 the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that A.B. Chance had a minimal expectation of privacy in its
safety and health records. The court then implemented its balancing
test.295  This approach defies the See principle that warrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable.296
Although See and Barlow's involved premises inspections rather
than records inspections, A.B. Chance should not be distinguished on
this basis. The compliance officer presumably would examine the
safety and health records on the company's nonpublic premises.
Courts have been sensitive to these types of on-site inspections.297
Like premises inspections, such on-site records inspections "invaded
corporate privacy and can disrupt the workplace... [, may ... result
in significant ... costs [, and] ... will in some cases enable regulators
to discover plain view evidence against a firm."' 298  Admittedly, the
plain view evidence argument may not be applicable here because an
A.B. Chance representative consented to an inspection of machin-
ery.299 Nevertheless, his consent extended only to the premises
inspection, not to the records inspection. a° Moreover, the applicable
OSHA regulations do not limit the compliance officer's discretion. A
compliance officer conceivably may limit his request to the scope of
the employee's complaint, or may demand a broad production of
292. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
294. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 726.
295. Id. at 726-27.
296. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 547 (1967).
297. E.g., United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 734 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1180 (1985). One commentator argues that "the import of [this]... case[ ] is
that any nonconsensual entry by the government onto nonpublic areas of business property to
review business records is subject to the Fourth Amendment." McDonald, IRCA and the
Fourth Amendment: Constitutionality of Warrantless Access Provisions, 13 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 426, 436 (1987-88).
298. New Orleans Public Service, 734 F.2d at 228.
299. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 45:201
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF OSHA RECORDS
records as occurred in Kings Island.3"' The Barlow's decision con-
fronted this type of discretion in the OSHA premises inspection con-
text.30 2 Thus, the protections afforded by Barlow's should apply in
this context.3 °3
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion regarding A.B. Chance's expec-
tation of privacy contravenes the conclusions of both the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits. As the Sixth Circuit explained, employers may
keep these records for a variety of purposes. 30 4 Further, many
employers maintained safety and health records prior to the enact-
ment of OSHA, when the Labor Department would have had to pro-
cure a warrant to obtain the records.30 5 The enactment of the
recordkeeping requirements should not remove any privacy interests
in the records. If the contrary were true, employers' personal rights
under the fourth amendment would be derivative of agency decisions
requiring the recordkeeping of particular information. Such agency
discretion conflicts with both See and Barlow's and with the policies
served by a search warrant.
An employer's expectation of privacy should not diminish
because he is required to post an annual summary of on-site injuries
and illnesses. This information is available only to those viewing an
employer's bulletin board.306 The employer has not made the infor-
mation publicly available because only those individuals with access
to the premises are privy to such information. Moreover, if govern-
mental agencies could remove a business owner's expectation of pri-
vacy in his safety and health records or any other records containing
documented information by requiring the business owner to post a
summary of that information, business owners would be subject to the
arbitrary discretion of compliance officers specifically, and the execu-
tive branch in general-a result historically condemned.307
If A.B. Chance had involved a regulatory scheme that required
the employer to present documentation to a governmental agency on
a regular basis, then the Fourth Circuit's holding would be correct.
The government's request for information would have been routine,
30 8
and courts have recognized that "a uniform statutory or regulatory
301. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
302. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321-26 (1978).
303. Id. at 321-22.
304. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
305. Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 (11th Cir. 1987).
306. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
307. The arbitrary discretion of executive officers was condemned in England in the late
eighteenth century. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
308. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 996 n.2 (citing California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974)).
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reporting requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment concern
regarding the potential for arbitrary invasions of privacy."3 °9 For
example, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a warrant-
less Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") search of a
bank president's office, even though the president also used the office
for his law practice.31 0 The FDIC conducted the warrantless search
as the receiver of the bank, pursuant to its statutory "duty to marshal
the Bank's assets and to wind up its affairs."3 1 The Second Circuit
upheld the search, inter alia, because bank records are subject to rou-
tine FDIC examination.312 The Supreme Court used similar reason-
ing in California Bankers Association v. Schultz,313 to uphold the
constitutionality of the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970.3' 4 In contrast, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, the
OSHA compliance officers' requests for the safety and health records
involved "discretionary and potentially arbitrary requests for docu-
ment inspection. '315 In such cases, courts should be wary of granting
field workers unbridled discretion. Requiring a warrant permits judi-
cial oversight and does not impose unreasonable burdens on the
Labor Department because an employee's complaint ordinarily fur-
nishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.316
Second, in implementing a balancing test, the Fourth Circuit did
not adequately address the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
It accepted the Labor Department's decision, as exemplified by the
OSHA regulations in question, that warrantless searches were neces-
sary and then conducted a balancing test to determine the reasonable-
ness of the regulatory scheme.317 In effect, such an analysis "permits
legislators and administrators to redefine reasonableness at will,"3 18
and transforms the See presumption that warrantless searches are
unreasonable into the exception, and the exception into the general
rule. A truer approach to the general warrant requirement rule would
require the Labor Department to demonstrate that the employers
309. Id.
310. United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g, 696 F. Supp. 910
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
311. Chuang, 696 F. Supp. at 914 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988); and Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 36 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985)).
312. Chuang, 897 F.2d at 650.
313. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
314. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 101, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
315. Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987).
316. D. LOFGREN, supra note 27, at 200.
317. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
318. Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1139.
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have reduced expectations of privacy in the records and that the regu-
latory scheme is reasonable under the fourth amendment.319 Such an
approach would not only safeguard See's principle that warrantless
searches of commercial premises are presumptively unreasonable,32 °
but would also reconfirm the principle that "[f]aw enforcement.
should work within bounds set by the Fourth Amendment, not vice
versa. ))321
The Fourth Circuit's utilization of a balancing test is also ques-
tionable as precedent. Balancing tests are vague and unpredictable. 322
Although the Fourth Circuit's test addressed such factors as congres-
sional intent, the invasion which the search entailed, the company's
expectation of privacy, and the discretion of the compliance officer, its
review of these factors provides little objective guidance for other
courts, especially in comparison to Burger's three-tiered test. The
Burger test not only provides more objective guidance, but also allows
courts to consider fully both the interests of businessmen and govern-
mental agencies.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's conclusions are questionable.
The Fourth Circuit declared that Congress intended a strong enforce-
ment scheme.323 While this may have been the case, it does not neces-
sarily follow that warrantless searches are required for the
enforcement of OSHA. Such a conclusion conflicts with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Barlow's. In Barlow's, the Court remained
"unconvinced... that requiring warrants to inspect [would] impose
serious burdens on the [OSHA] inspection scheme or the courts,
[would] prevent inspections to enforce the statute, or [would] make
them less effective. 324  Although there may be factual differences
between Barlow's and A.B. Chance, these differences were not suffi-
cient for either the Sixth or Eleventh Circuit to distinguish Barlow's.
The distinctions between the investigations in Barlow's and A.B.
Chance reflect that OSHA will not be seriously burdened with regard
319. See United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stressing that in the
context of criminal cases, the relevant precedent establishes that a warrantless search is
presumptively unconstitutional and that the government bears the burden of proving that a
particular exception applies).
320. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
321. Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1139 n.61.
322. Cf. id. at 1137 (arguing that courts "have resorted to a more flexible and less rule-
bound 'balancing' methodology in civil cases" and that courts are increasingly implementing
this approach in the criminal context).
323. McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724, 727 (4th Cir. 1988).
324. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978). Even a former OSHA
compliance officer concedes that "OSHA generally has little trouble obtaining a [search]
warrant[ ] if the inspection is conducted pursuant to a signed employee complaint." D.
LOFGREN, supra note 27, at 200.
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to inspections of safety and health records. In Barlow's, the compli-
ance officer .sought to investigate safety hazards. 25 Requiring a
search warrant in that context could inhibit OSHA's enforcement
more than by requiring a warrant in the records context. Arguably,
in the records context there is less chance of an employer tampering
with the records while a compliance officer obtains a search warrant
because employers must post an annual summary of the workplace
injuries and illnesses.326 Supporting this conclusion is the Sixth Cir-
cuit's observation that the Labor Department was "not concerned
that employers [would] alter or destroy the records upon being given
notice and a hearing. ' 327
The final criticism of A.B. Chance centers around policy con-
cerns in today's regulatory society. If courts do not require that an
administrative agency obtain a search warrant, or at least permit an
employer to demand an administrative subpoena, a business enter-
prise could be subject to a number of searches from different agencies
without having the opportunity for judicial review. For example, pur-
suant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA), a23 the Labor Department conducts investigations of 1-9 ver-
ification forms that employers are required to maintain. 2 9 IRCA
gives the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Labor
Department unrestricted access to the verification forms.33a Under
the Fourth Circuit's approach, the Labor Department conceivably
could enter upon a business owner's premises to investigate an
employee health complaint and make a warrantless request for the
employer's safety and health records. In addition, the compliance
officer could make a warrantless request for the 1-9 forms. In such a
setting, where an employer could be subject to a number of investiga-
tions, judicial review is even more necessary. The Fourth Circuit's
approach, however, potentially enhances warrantless searches not
only by the Labor Department, but also by other governmental agen-
cies. Such searches contradict the purposes served by a search war-
rant,3 the principles enunciated in See,332 and the decisions of the
325. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 310-11.
326. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5 (1989).
327. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 1988).
328. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 1, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
329. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (1988). Since the passage of IRCA, the relationship
between the Labor Department and the INS has intensified, thereby subjecting employers to
potentially increased scrutiny. Cf McDonald, supra note 297, at 426-27.
330. See McDonald, supra note 297, at 428.
331. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
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Eleventh Circuit in Emerson a"I and the Sixth Circuit in Kings
Island.334
B. Implementation of the Burger Framework
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's mode of analysis in Kings
Island, the Fourth Circuit does not invoke, or even mention, the Bur-
ger 33 holding. The Burger analytic framework is useful for evaluat-
ing whether warrantless administrative searches are constitutional
under the fourth amendment. It recognizes the general rule that a
search warrant is required for administrative searches,3 36 but also
acknowledges that exceptions exist.337 If a governmental agency can
demonstrate reduced privacy expectations, its warrantless inspection
may be constitutional if it meets the three-tiered Burger reasonable-
ness test. 3 s
No exceptions to the warrant requirement exist in A.B. Chance.
In Kings Island, the Labor Department conceded that the pervasively
regulated industries exception did not apply.339 The Eleventh Circuit
reached the same conclusion in Emerson.34  This exception is lim-
ited, 341 and the Supreme Court has interpreted it to apply only to
particular industries.342 As the Barlow's Court recognized, OSHA
potentially applies to all businesses rather than to a particular indus-
try, such as the liquor industry or the firearms industry.3 4 Thus, the
Court concluded that businesses subject to OSHA's reach were not
per se within the pervasively regulated industries exception. 3 " Using
a similar rationale, a district court concluded that the exception did
not apply to federal government employees when it determined the
constitutionality of a drug testing program.345
The alleged underlying rationale of this exception does not justify
333. See supra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 210-49 and accompanying text.
335. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
336. See id. at 699-702.
337. Id. at 702.
338. Id. at 702-03.
339. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1988).
340. Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 (1lth Cir. 1987).
341. See Usery v. Centriff-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (interpreting
the pervasively regulated industries exception as a narrow exception to the Camara-See
holdings).
342. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
343. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314 (1978).
344. Id.
345. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416, 430 (D.D.C.),
modified on other grounds, 3 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 128 (D.D.C.), stay granted,
3 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 128 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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the determination that warrantless searches are constitutional in the
context of compliance officer searches of employers' safety and health
records. If it did, it would undermine the Barlow's Court's conclusion
that businesses subject to OSHA are not by definition within the per-
vasively regulated industries exception.346 Additionally, an increase
in the scope of the exception would result, as is already evident in
several Supreme Court decisions.347 Such a process would ultimately
lead to the exceptions' engulfing of the general warrant requirement
rule.
Additionally, an employer's privacy interests in safety and health
records is not diminished in light of the Labor Department's regula-
tory interests. Business owners not only have expectations of privacy
in safety and health records, but also in their business premises. Such
expectations should not diminish as a result of the promulgation of
recordkeeping requirements.
The Burger framework focuses on the fourth amendment reason-
ableness requirement. 348 Even if the Labor Department could estab-
lish that one of the preceding exceptions applied, the statutorily
authorized searches need to satisfy the fourth amendment reasonable-
ness requirement. 349 Applying the three-tiered Burger reasonableness
test,350 the OSHA regulatory scheme is unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. While the Labor Department could establish a substan-
tial governmental interest to support the need to regulate commercial
enterprises,35' it cannot maintain, as the Sixth Circuit noted,352 either
that warrantless searches are essential to furthering the OSHA regula-
tory scheme or that the regulatory framework provides an adequate
substitute for a warrant. Regarding the former, the Supreme Court's
finding in Barlow's that OSHA's effectiveness would not be under-
mined if warrants were required in order to conduct safety inspections
is equally applicable here.353 As to the latter, the statute does not
provide for any type of judicial oversight prior to the conduct of a
search.35 4 Only "after the fact" judicial review is provided, which
most certainly contravenes the precedent established by See and Bar-
low's-that judicial intervention is necessary to prevent unbridled
346. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 314.
347. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
349. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
350. Id. at 702-03.
351. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
352. McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 1988).
353. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
354. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.
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governmental discretion.355
V. CONCLUSION
In today's regulatory society, employers' fourth amendment
rights often conflict with governmental agencies' authority to conduct
warrantless administrative searches. The judicially recognized rule is
that a search warrant is necessary for a search to be reasonable.
Courts, however, have recognized exceptions to this rule.
Although governmental agencies may have valid reasons to con-
duct warrantless searches, courts must be wary of rubber stamping
agency decisions to conduct such searches without analyzing both
agency concerns and th,. personal rights of businessmen. The Fourth
Circuit held that the OSHA regulations requiring voluntary produc-
tion of employers' safety and health records were constitutional, even
though they permitted warrantless searches.356 This holding conflicts
with the decisions of the Eleventh357 and Sixth35  Circuits. An analy-
sis of the Sixth Circuit's decision discloses that using the Burger ana-
lytic framework permits courts to respect the general warrant
requirement rule. Using this framework is preferable to having a
court defer to an agency decision that warrantless searches are neces-
sary and then conduct a balancing test. The Burger approach pro-
vides added judicial vigilance during this era of governmental
regulation-an era when our constitutional rights increasingly appear
to be in jeopardy.
CARLOS B. CASTILLO
355. In a hearing subsequent to the three cases under consideration, an Occupational Safety
and Health Commission Administrative Law Judge vacated a citation issued to an employer
who refused to provide a compliance officer with safety and health records, allegedly in
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7 (1989). Secretary of Labor v. Hem Iron Works, Inc., 14
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1446 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Dec. 2, 1989). The judge concluded "that 29
CFR 1904.7 is constitutionally invalid insofar as it purports to authorize an inspection of
required records without a warrant or its equivalent, such as an employer's consent." Id.
356. McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance Co., 842 F.2d 724, 728-29 (4th Cir. 1988).
357. Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 997 (11th Cir. 1987).
358. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.
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